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Abstract—It is known that given the real sum of two indepen-
dent uniformly distributed lattice points from the same nested
lattice codebook, the eavesdropper can obtain at most 1 bit
of information per channel regarding the value of one of the
lattice points. In this work, we study the effect of this 1 bit
information on the equivocation expressed in three commonly
used information theoretic measures, i.e., the Shannon entropy,
the Re´nyi entropy and the min entropy. We then demonstrate
its applications in an interference channel with a confidential
message. In our previous work, we showed that nested lattice
codes can outperform Gaussian codes for this channel when the
achieved rate is measured with the weak secrecy notion. Here,
with the Re´nyi entropy and the min entropy measure, we prove
that the same secure degree of freedom is achievable with the
strong secrecy notion as well. A major benefit of the new coding
scheme is that the strong secrecy is generated from a single
lattice point instead of a sequence of lattice points. Hence the
mutual information between the confidential message and the
observation of the eavesdropper decreases much faster with the
number of channel uses than previously known strong secrecy
coding methods for nested lattice codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic secrecy, first proposed by Shannon
[1], is an approach to study the secrecy aspect of a com-
munication system against a computation power unbounded
adversary. This approach was later applied to the wiretap
channel [2]–[4] and recently extended to multiple access
channel [5], broadcast channel [6], interference channel [7].
The focus of this body of literature is on the fundamental
rate limits at which secret communication can take place.
Lattice codes were found recently to be useful in construct-
ing information theoretically secure coding schemes [8]. In
[8], [9], the authors showed that with the nested lattice code,
the real sum of two lattice points leaked at most 1 bit of
information per channel use to the eavesdropper regarding
the value of one of the lattice points. Using this property,
secrecy rate can then be achieved by using a random wiretap
code while restricting the channel inputs to lattice points. The
coding scheme is shown to be useful in providing secrecy in
a multi-hop relay channel [8] and interference channels [9]–
[12] . In particular, it outperforms Gaussian signaling scheme
at high SNR in many fully connected two user Gaussian
Channels with interference [9], [12].
The secrecy rates in all these works are derived with the
notion of weak secrecy. If the observation of the eavesdropper
is Zn, and the confidential message is W , then weak secrecy
requires:
lim
n→∞
1
n
I (W ;Zn) = 0 (1)
However, sometimes, it is more useful to upper bound the
following term:∑
W,Zn
|p (W,Zn)− p (W ) p (Zn) | (2)
which tells how different the joint distribution of {W,Zn}
is from this distribution if they are truly independent. Such a
bound can be found via the Pinsker’s inequality [13, Theorem
2.33] if I (W ;Zn) can be bounded. Yet, it is clear that it is
not possible to upper bound I (W ;Zn) with the weak secrecy
notion in (1). In fact, I (W ;Zn) can still be arbitrarily large
despite (1) being valid. For example, it can increase at the
rate of log(n). To solve this problem, it is necessary to switch
to the strong secrecy notion, which is defined as:
lim
n→∞
I (W ;Zn) = 0 (3)
In this work, we focus on how to achieve the strong secrecy
notion using the nested lattice codes.
There are two known techniques in achieving strong se-
crecy. Reference [14] shows that for any discrete memoryless
wiretap channel, it is possible for both the decoding error
probability and I(W ;Zn) to decrease exponentially with the
number of the channel use. Yet, the proof of [14] uses random
codes, and does not naturally extend to the lattice codes.
One way to get around this problem is to treat each lattice
point as a single channel use [15], [16], and design random
codes for this extended channel using the method from [14].
However, as we will show later, doing so makes the length of
a codeword to be much larger than the dimension of a lattice
point. Because of this reason, the exponentially decreasing
property of I(W ;Zn) in n is lost.
Reference [17] proposed that for a discrete memoryless
channel, if there is a coding scheme that achieves weak
secrecy given by (1), it can be combined with the privacy
amplification technique in [18] to achieve the strong se-
crecy notion in (3). The exponential decreasing property
of I(W ;Zn) was not shown in [17] but can be proved
by replacing the weak typicality used in [17] with strong
typicality. Yet, since the proof of [17] relies on the typicality
property of a i.i.d. generated sequence , it is again for random
codes. If this approach were to be used with lattice codes,
we will encounter the same problem we had with [14], i.e.,
the exponentially decreasing property of I(W ;Zn) will be
lost.
The coding scheme proposed in this work avoids this
problem through a different method of lower bounding Re´nyi
entropy and min entropy. In [17], this is obtained via the
typicality property of i.i.d. sequence. Here it is proved instead
using the representation theorem proposed in [8], [9], a
unique property of nested lattice structure. The strong secrecy
is hence generated from a single lattice point rather than a
sequence of lattice points. Consequently, the exponentially
decreasing property of I(W ;Zn) is preserved.
The rest part of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we summarize useful results on the effect of side
information on information theoretic measures. These results
show that revealing m bits of information will not decrease
entropy measures by more than m with high probability. In
Section III, we apply these results to lattice nested code, by
viewing the integer in the representation theorem as the side
information. We then use these results to prove achievable
secure degree of freedom for an interference channel with
confidential messages. The channel model is described in
Section IV. The achievable secure degree of freedom is stated
in Section V and proved in Section VI and Section VII.
Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. EFFECT OF SIDE INFORMATION ON INFORMATION
THEORETIC MEASURE
In this section, we provide some supporting results which
will be used later. Let X,T denote two discrete random
variable.
Definition 1: For a discrete random variable X , the Shan-
non entropy H(X) is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x
Pr(X = x) log2 Pr(X = x) (4)
The Re´nyi entropy H2(X) is defined as
H2(X) = − log2
∑
x
Pr(X = x)2 (5)
The min entropy H∞(X) is defined as
H∞(X) = − log2max
x
Pr(X = x) (6)
Let ‖T ‖ denote the cardinality of the alphabet set T is
defined on. Then we have the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: [19] For Shannon entropy, we have:
H(X |T ) ≥ H(X)− log2 ‖T ‖ (7)
The relationship says the introduction of log2 ‖T ‖ bits side
information can not decrease the entropy of X by more than
log2 ‖T ‖ bits. The proof follows from the following equation:
H (X) ≤ H (X,T ) (8)
=H (X |T ) +H (T ) (9)
≤H (X |T ) + log2 ‖T ‖ (10)
In our previous work [8], [9], we use this lemma to prove
that using nested lattice codes, the real sum of two lattice
points from the same lattice codebook leaks at most 1 bit of
information per channel use to the eavesdropper regarding
the value of one of the lattice points, if the other point is
independently generated and uniformly distributed over the
codebook. This result opens the door for applying nested
lattice codes to achieve weak secrecy in Gaussian channels.
Lemma 2: [20, P 106, Theorem 5.2] [17, Lemma 3] For
Re´nyi entropy and s > 0, we have:
Pr (t : H2 (X)−H2 (X |T = t) ≤ log2 ‖T ‖+ s)
≥ 1− 2−(s/2−1) (11)
The lemma says with high probability the introduction of
log2 ‖T ‖ bits side information can not decrease the Re´nyi
entropy of X by more than log2 ‖T ‖ bits. The proof can be
found in [20, P 106, Theorem 5.2]. In [20], T is also called
“spoiler information”. Later, we will use this lemma to prove
strong secrecy rate based on the universal hash function.
Lemma 3: [17, Lemma 10] For min entropy and s > 0,
we have:
Pr (t : H∞ (X)−H∞ (X |T = t) ≤ log2 ‖T ‖+ s)
≥ 1− 2−s (12)
The lemma says with high probability the introduction of
log2 ‖T ‖ bits side information can not decrease the min
entropy of X by more than log2 ‖T ‖ bits. A proof of this
lemma is provided in Appendix A. Later, we will use this
lemma to prove strong secret key rate based on extractor
functions [21].
III. NESTED LATTICE CODES
In this section, we describe the nested lattice codes, the
representation theorem from [8], [9] and its implication in
terms of the three information theoretic measures described
in Section II.
A nested lattice code is defined as an intersection of an
N -dimensional “fine” lattice Λ and the fundamental region
of an N -dimensional “coarse” lattice Λc, denoted by V(Λc).
Λ,Λc ⊂ RN . The term “nested” comes from the fact that
Λc ⊂ Λ. The modulus operation is defined as the quantization
error of a point x with respect to the coarse lattice Λc:
x mod Λc = x− arg min
u∈Λc
‖x− u‖2 (13)
where ‖x− y‖2 is the Euclidean distance between x and y in
R
N
. It can be verified that Λ∩V(Λc) is a finite Abelian group
when the addition operation between two elements x, y ∈
Λ ∩ V(Λc) is defined as
x+ y mod Λc (14)
The signal XN transmitted over N channel uses from a
nested lattice codebook is given by
XN = (uN + dN ) mod Λc (15)
Here uN is the lattice point chosen from Λ∩V(Λc), and dN
is called the dithering vector. Conventionally, dN is defined
as a continuous random vector which is uniformly distributed
over V(Λc) [22]. It was shown in [9] that a fixed dithering
vector can be used. Either way, the nature of dN will not
affect the result described below. In the following, we assume
uN is independent from dN . We also assume that dN is
perfectly known by all receiving nodes, and hence, is not
used to enhance secrecy.
As will be shown later, our goal in general will be to bound
the expression of the following form: For Shannon entropy,
it is written as:
H(uN1 |XN1 ±XN2 , dN1 , dN2 ) (16)
For Re´nyi entropy and min entropy, simply replace H in
(16) with H2 and H∞ respectively. Here Here uNi , XNi , dNi
correspond to the uN , XN , dN mentioned above respectively.
That is to say that uNi ∈ Λ∩V(Λc); dNi is the dithering noise;
XNi = (u
N
i +d
N
i ) mod Λc. In addition, uNi , dNi , i = 1, 2 are
independent.
All three information theoretic measures considered in this
work can be bounded using the representation theorem from
[8], [9]:
Theorem 1: Let t1, t2, ..., tK be K numbers taken from
the fundamental region of a given lattice Λ. There exists a
integer T , such that 1 ≤ T ≤ KN , and
K∑
k=1
tk is uniquely
determined by {T,
K∑
k=1
tk mod Λ}.
The proof can be found in [9].
Clearly, XNi , i = 1, 2 are in the fundamental region of
Λc. Hence the theorem says XN1 + XN2 can be uniquely
determined by T, (XN1 +XN2 ) mod Λc, 1 ≤ T ≤ 2N . Since
fundamental region of Λc is symmetric with respect to the
origin, the same results hold for XN1 −XN2 as well.
In the sequel, let T be the integer whose existence is
guaranteed by Theorem 1. For a discrete random variable X ,
let x¯ denote a deterministic value such that Pr(X = x¯) > 0.
With these notations, we have the following corollary to the
three lemmas in Section II.
Corollary 1: In terms of Shannon entropy, we have
H
(
uN1 |uN1 ± uN2 mod Λc, dNi , i = 1, 2
)
−H (uN1 |XN1 ±XN2 , dNi , i = 1, 2) ≤ log2 ‖T ‖ (17)
In terms of Re´nyi entropy, consider the inequality
H2(u
N
1 |uN1 ± uN2 mod Λc = u¯, dNi = d¯Ni , i = 1, 2)
−H2
(
uN1 |XN1 ±XN2 = x¯, dNi = d¯Ni , i = 1, 2
)
≤ log2 ‖T ‖+ s (18)
where x¯ is a function of u¯, d¯Ni and T . Then we have
Pr
(
t¯ : T = t¯, and (18) holds ) ≥ 1− 2−(s/2−1) (19)
In terms of min entropy, consider the inequality:
H∞
(
uN1 |uN1 ± uN2 mod Λc = u¯, dNi = d¯Ni , i = 1, 2
)
−H∞
(
uN1 |XN1 ±XN2 = x¯, dNi = d¯Ni , i = 1, 2
)
≤ log2 ‖T ‖+ s (20)
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Fig. 1. The Gaussian Wiretap Channel with a Cooperative Jammer
we have
Pr
(
t¯ : T = t¯, and (20) holds ) ≥ 1− 2−s (21)
Proof: Equation (17) uses Lemma 1 and its proof can
be found in [8], [9].
We next prove (19). We begin with:
H2
(
uN1 |XN1 ±XN2 = x¯, dNi = d¯Ni , i = 1, 2
) (22)
=H2(u
N
1 |
2∑
j=1
(
uNj + d
N
j
)
mod Λc = x¯,
dNi = d¯
N
i , i = 1, 2) (23)
From Theorem 1, (23) can be written as:
H2(u
N
1 |(
2∑
j=1
uNj + d
N
j ) mod Λc = x¯
′,
T = t¯, dNi = d¯
N
i , i = 1, 2) (24)
where x¯′ is a constant such that when (
2∑
j=1
uNj + d
N
j ) mod
Λc = x¯
′ and T = t¯, we have
2∑
j=1
(
uNj + d
N
j
)
mod Λc = x¯.
Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of such x¯′ and t¯.
We then consider T as the side information and apply
Lemma 2 to (24). This yields (19).
The proof for (21) is similar. We simply rewrite (23)-(24)
by replacing H2 with H∞. Equation (21) follows by viewing
T as the side information and apply Lemma 3.
Hence we have proved the Corollary.
We next demonstrate the usefulness of Corollary 1 in an
interference channel with confidential message.
IV. CHANNEL MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We will focus on the Gaussian wiretap channel with a
cooperative jammer [23] . All results derived in this work
extend to the K-user interference channel with a confidential
message in a straightforward manner.
The channel model is shown in Figure 1. As shown in
this figure, after normalizing the channel gains of the two
intended links to 1, the received signals at the two receiving
node D1 and D2 can be expressed as
Y˜1 = X˜1 +
√
aX2 + Z1
Y2 =
√
bX˜1 ±X2 + Z2
(25)
where Zi, i = 1, 2 is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable
with unit variance, and
√
a,
√
b and Zi are real numbers.
As in [9], we let X1 =
√
bX˜1 and Y1 =
√
bY˜1. Then from
(25), we have
Y1 = X1 +
√
abX2 +
√
bZ1
Y2 = X1 ±X2 + Z2
(26)
In the sequel, we will focus on this scaled model which will
be more convenient to explain our results.
In [9], we calculate the weak secrecy rate for this model.
In this work, we will calculate the strong secrecy rate and
strong secrecy key rate, which we shall define shortly.
In the strong secrecy rate problem, node S1 sends a
message W1 via X˜1 to node D1, which must be kept secret
from node D2. Let M1 be the local randomness at S1 and
fi be its encoding function at the ith channel use. Then we
have:
X1,i = fi (W1,M1) (27)
Node S2, the cooperative jammer, sends signal X2.
Let Wˆ1 be the estimate of W1 by node D1. For D1 to
receive W1 reliably, we require
lim
n→∞
Pr
(
W1 6= Wˆ1
)
= 0 (28)
In addition, since W1 must be kept secret from D2, we
require the strong secrecy notion as defined in (3), which
takes the following expression for this model:
lim
n→∞
I (W1;Y
n
2 ) = 0 (29)
The achieved secrecy rate Re is defined as:
Re = lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W1) (30)
such that the conditions (28), (29) are fulfilled simultane-
ously.
In the secret key generation problem, node S1 and D1 com-
municate for n channel uses and after that wants to generate
the same key from the signals available to them. Let g1, g2
be the generation function used by S1 and D1 respectively.
Let M1,M2 be their local randomness respectively. Then
K1 = g1(M1) (31)
Kˆ1 = g2(M2, Y
n
1 ) (32)
The encoding function at node 1 for the ith channel use is
defined as
X1,i = fi(M1) (33)
and we require:
lim
n→∞
Pr(K1 6= Kˆ1) = 0 (34)
lim
n→∞
I(K1;Y
n
2 ) = 0 (35)
The achieved secrecy key rate Rk,e is defined as
Rk,e = lim
n→∞
1
n
H (K1) (36)
such that the conditions (34), (35) are fulfilled simultane-
ously.
For both problems, there are two constraints on the input
distribution to the channel model in (26): First, we assume
there is no common randomness shared by the encoders of
S1 and S2. This means, the input distribution to the channel
is constrained to be
p (Xm1 ) p (X
m
2 ) (37)
where m is the number of channel uses involved. Intuitively,
this implies that if X2 is employed to send interference to
confuse the eavesdropper, its effect can not be mitigated by
coding X1 via dirty-paper coding [24].
Second, the average power of Xi is constrained to be P¯i.
If Xi,j is the jth component of Xi, this means:
lim
m→∞
1
m
m∑
j=1
E
[|Xi,j |2] ≤ P¯i, i = 1, 2 (38)
In the next section, we examine the high SNR behavior
of Re and Re,k when these two requirements on the channel
input distribution are fulfilled.
V. MAIN RESULTS
Definition 2: The secure degree of freedom of the secrecy
rate is defined as:
s.d.o.f. = lim sup
P¯i→∞,i=1,2
Re
1
2 log2
(
2∑
i=1
P¯i
) (39)
The secure degree of freedom of the secrecy key rate is
defined in the same way by replacing Re in (39) with Rk,e.
We also notice that any
√
ab,
√
ab 6= 0, can be represented
in the following form:
√
ab = p/q + γ/q (40)
where p, q are positive integers, and −1 < γ < 1, γ 6= 0. In
this case, the channel model (26) can be expressed as:
qY1 = qX1 + (p+ γ)X2 + q
√
bZ1 (41)
Y2 = X1 ±X2 + Z2 (42)
Using this notation, we have the following theorem regarding
the achievable secure degree of freedom:
Theorem 2: There exists a encoder {fi}, such that the
following secure degree of freedom is achievable using nested
lattice codes when 0 < |γ| < 0.5:[
0.25 log2 (α)− 1
1
2 log2 (αβ + 1)
]+
(43)
where
α =
1− 2γ2 +
√
1− 4γ2
2γ4
(44)
and
β = q2 + (p+ γ)
2 (45)
such that for any given transmission power
lim
n→∞
− 1
n
log2 I (W1;Y
n
2 ) > 0 (46)
where n denotes the total number of channel uses.
Theorem 3: There are generation functions gj, j = 1, 2
with explicit construction, such that (43) is the achievable
secure degree of freedom for the key generation problem,
and for any given transmission power:
lim
n→∞
− 1√
n
log2 I (K1;Y
n
2 ) > 0 (47)
where n denotes the total number of channel uses.
Remark 1: In [9], we proved that (43) is the achievable
s.d.o.f. for the weak secrecy notion. Here, we show that the
same s.d.o.f. is achievable for the strong secrecy notion.
Remark 2: Reference [14], [17] show that using the strong
secrecy notion instead of the weak one did not decrease the
achievable secrecy rate. This coincides with the observation
in Remark 1. Yet, the proofs in [14], [17] use random codes,
and does not naturally extend to the lattice codes. One way
to get around this problem is to treat each lattice point as
a single channel use [15], and design random codes for
this extended channel using the method [14]. However, as
mentioned in the introduction, doing so will not achieve the
exponential decrease property as given by (46) and (47).
To see that, let each codeword in this randomly generated
codebook contains M lattice points, and the dimension of the
lattice be N . Then it was proved in [22] that the decoding
error probability decreases exponentially with respect to N .
Also from the coding scheme in [14], we have I(W ;Y n2 )
decreases exponentially with respect to M . Since the total
number of channel uses in this case is MN , (46) and (47) no
longer holds unless N does not increase proportionally with
M . Hence, unless a significant price is paid on the decoding
error probability, the exponential decrease in I(W ;Y n2 ) can
not be preserved.
Remark 3: The proof of Theorem 2 uses universal hash
function and is existential. The secrecy notion achieved by
Theorem 3 is weaker but its proof is constructive. The proof
uses on the extractor function proposed in [21], which gives
explicit construction of the function.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first introduce some useful results on universal hash
functions.
Definition 3: [18, Definition 1] A set of functions A →
B is a class of universal hash function if for a function g
taken from the set according to a uniform distribution, and
x1, x2 ∈ A, x1 6= x2, the probability that g(x1) = g(x2) is
at most 1/|B|.
Theorem 4: [18, Corollary 4] Let G be selected according
to a uniform distribution from a class of universal hash
function from A to GF(q)r . For two random variables A,B,
if for a constant c, H2(A|B = b) > c, then
H(G(A)|G,B = b) > r log2 q −
2r log2 q−c
ln 2
(48)
Let G be taken from a set of linear mapping from GF(q)N
to GF(q)r according to a uniform distribution. Hence G can
be represented as a matrix over GF(q) with r rows and N
columns. For this class of G, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4: The probability that G has full row rank is
greater than 1− qr−N .
Proof: Let gi, i = 1, ..., r be the ith row of G. Then G
does not have full row rank if and only if
a1g1 + a2g2 + ...+ argr = 0, ai ∈ GF(q) (49)
Since at least one ai has to be non-zero, there are qr − 1
possible choice for ai.
For each choice of {ai}, since one ai is not zero, there
are qN(r−1) solutions for {gi}. Hence there are at most
qN(r−1)(qr−1) Gs that do not have full row rank. There are
qNr possible Gs in all, each chosen with equal probability.
Hence the probability that G does not have full row rank
smaller than qr−N , and we have Lemma 4.
The reason that we are interested in this class of G is because
of the following lemma:
Lemma 5: [18] The set of linear mapping as defined in
Lemma 4 is a class of universal hash function.
We then briefly describe the lattice codebook from [9], which
we shall generate strong secrecy from.
In this coding scheme, node Sk sends the signal XNk over
N channel uses. XNk is the sum of codewords from several
layers as shown below:
XNk =
M∑
i=1
XNk,i, k = 1, 2 (50)
where M is the total number of layers in use. XNk,i is the
signal sent by the Sk in the ith layer. For each layer, we use
the nested lattice code described in Section III. Let {Λi,Λc,i}
be nested lattice pair assigned to layer i. Then the signal XNk,i
is computed according to this nested lattice pair as:
XNk,i =
(
uNk,i + d
N
k,i
)
mod Λc,i k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M
(51)
where dNk,i is the dithering vector, uniformly distributed
over V (Λc,i), perfectly known by all receiving nodes and
independently generated for each node, each layer and each
block of N channel uses. Let uNk,i be the lattice point such
that:
uNk,i ∈ V (Λc,i) ∩ Λi, k = 1, 2 (52)
Note that both node S1 and S2 use the same lattice codebook
for each layer. We choose the input distribution to the channel
such that uNk,i is uniformly distributed over V (Λc,i)∩Λi and
uNk,i is independent between each node, each layer and each
bloc of N channel channel uses.
Define Ri, i = 1, ...,M as the rate of the codebook for the
ith layer:
Ri =
1
N
log2 |V (Λc,i) ∩ Λi| (53)
Define R0 as the average rate per layer:
R0 =
1
M
M∑
i=1
Ri (54)
Define ΛM∩V(Λc)M as the M -fold Cartesian product of Λi∩
V(Λc,i), i = 1...M . Note that ΛM ∩V(Λc)M is also a nested
lattice codebook. Its dimension is denoted by N¯ = MN .
Define tN¯i , i = 1, 2 as the Cartesian product of uNk,i, k =
1, ...,M, i = 1, 2. Define tN¯1 ⊕tN¯2 as uNk,1+uNk,2 mod Λc, k =
1, ...,M . The shorthand d = d¯ to denote dN¯j = d¯N¯j , j = 1, 2.
Let ⌊x⌋ be the operation that rounds x to the nearest integer
less than or equal to x. Define N¯0 as
N¯0 =
⌊
log2 |ΛM ∩ V (Λc)M |
⌋
(55)
Then
N¯0 ≥ N¯R0 − 1 (56)
Choose the subset K of the codebook (Λ+dN1 )M ∩V (Λc)M
that yields the minimal average decoding error probability
with the lattice decoder and has size |K| = 2N¯0 . Define v as
the one-to-one mapping from K to GF(2N¯0).
We begin with the fact that tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 is independent from
tN¯1 , from which we have:
H2
(
v(tN¯1 )|tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 = tN¯ , d = d¯
)
= H2
(
v(tN¯1 )
)
(57)
According to Corollary 1, we have, for a given integer a,
1 ≤ a ≤ 2N¯ and tN¯ taken from ΛM ∩ V(Λc)M , with a
probability of at least 1− 2−(s/2−1):
H2
(
v(tN¯1 )|tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 = tN¯ , d = d¯, T = a
)
(58)
≥H2
(
v(tN¯1 )|tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 = tN¯ , d = d¯
)
− log2 |T | − s (59)
=N¯0 − N¯ − s (60)
≤N¯(R0 − 1)− 1− s (61)
where (61) follows from (56).
For a positive integer r¯0, let G be a random function which
is uniformly distributed over the set of linear functions from
GF(2)N¯0 to GF(2)r¯0 . Then when (58)-(61) holds, we have
the following equations because of Theorem 4:
H
(
G
(
v(tN¯1 )
)
|G, tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 = tN¯ , d = d¯, T = a
)
(62)
≥r¯0 − 2
r¯0−c
ln 2
(63)
where c = N¯(R0 − 1)− 1− s.
Since the probability that (58)-(61) holds is at least 1 −
2−(s/2−1), we have:
H
(
G
(
v(tN¯1 )
)
|G, tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 , d, T
)
(64)
≥
(
1− 2−(s/2−1)
)(
r¯0 − 2
r¯0−c
ln 2
)
(65)
Choose s = εN¯ , where 0 < ε < R0 − 1. Choose r¯0 such
that for δ > 0:
r¯0 < N¯(R0 − 1)− s− N¯δ ≤ N¯0 − N¯ − s− N¯δ/2 (66)
It can be verified for this r¯0 we have
0 ≤ r¯0 ≤ N¯ [R0 − 1− ε′]+ (67)
for a constant ε′ > 0. For this r¯0 and s, from (65), we observe
that there exists β > 0, such that
I
(
G
(
v(tN¯1 )
)
; tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 , d, T |G
)
≤ e−βN¯ (68)
We next use the fact that for sufficiently large N , hence N¯ ,
most G has full row rank as shown in Lemma 4. Therefore,
there must exists a G = g, such that
1) g has full rank.
2) I
(
G
(
v(tN¯1 )
)
; tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 , T |G = g
)
≤ 2e−βN¯
Note that this g is chosen for a uniform distribution for
tN¯i , i = 1, 2, t
N¯
1 and tN¯2 being independent and is not
necessarily a good choice for other channel input distribution.
This result can then be used to an encoder with rate
arbitrarily close to [M(R0 − 1)]+, as shown below:
Let g′ be (N¯0 − r¯0) × N¯0 matrix such that
[
g′
g
]
is
invertible. Define S such that S′ such that[
g′
(N¯0−r¯0)×N¯0
gr¯0×N¯0
]
v(tN¯1 ) =
[
S′
(N¯0−r¯0)×1
Sr¯0×1
]
(69)
Then S = g(v(tN¯1 )). Define A as the inverse of
[
g′
g
]
, then
the encoder is given by:
tN¯1 = v
−1A
[
S′
(N¯0−r¯0)×1
Sr¯0×1
]
(70)
where S ∈ GF(2r¯0) be the input to the encoder. We assume
S is uniformly distributed over GF(2r¯0). tN¯1 ∈ ΛM ∩
V(Λc)M be its output. S′ represents the randomness in the
encoding scheme. We observe that, if {S′
(N¯0−r¯0)×1
, Sr¯0×1}
is uniformly distributed over GF(2)N¯0 and (70) is used as
the encoder, tN¯1 is also uniformly distributed over the set K .
Since G = g is chosen when tN¯1 has a uniform distribution
over K , this means when (70) is used as an encoder, (68)
still holds.
With this encoder as (70), and S be the confidential
message W , G = g, (68) can be re-written as
I
(
W ; tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 , d, T
)
≤ 2e−βMN (71)
From Theorem 1, it can re-written as
I
(
W ;XN1 +X
N
2 , d
N
1 , d
N
2
) ≤ 2e−βMN (72)
Since Y N2 = XN1 + XN2 + ZN2 , from the data processing
inequality, (72) implies
I
(
W ;Y N2 , d
N
1 , d
N
2
) ≤ 2e−βMN (73)
Again the proof so far does not depend on the nature
of dNj , j = 1, 2. As shown in [9], dNj only affects the
probability of decoding errors at the intended receiver and the
average power of the transmitters, and we can choose dNj as
deterministic vectors. In this case, (73) is simply I(W ;Y N2 ).
Hence we have proved the theorem.
VII. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We first introduce some useful results on extractor func-
tions.
The definition of an extractor function can be found in [17,
Definition 6]. For a random variable whose min-entropy can
be lower bounded, [17] has the following lemma:
Lemma 6: [17, Lemma 9] Let δ′,∆1,∆2 > 0 be con-
stants. Then there exists, for all sufficiently large N , an
extractor function E: {0, 1}N × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}r, where
d ≤ ∆1N and r ≥ (δ′ − ∆2)N , such that for all random
variables A whose alphabet is defined over {0, 1}N and
H∞(A) > δ
′N , we have
H(E(A, V )|V ) ≥ r − 2−N1/2−o(1) (74)
The lemma says introducing a small amount of pure ran-
domness, V , one can extract almost all min-entropy from a
weakly random source. Its proof can be found in [17], which
is based on an efficiently constructible extractor design from
[21].
We use the same lattice codebook from [9] and follow the
same notation in Section VI.
We begin with:
H∞
(
v(tN¯1 )|tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 = tN¯ , d = d¯
)
= H∞
(
v(tN¯1 )
)
(75)
According to Corollary 1, we have, for a given integer a, 1 ≤
a ≤ 2N¯ and tN¯ taken from ΛM ∩ V(Λc)M , with probability
1− 2−s:
H∞
(
v(tN¯1 )|tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 = tN¯ , d = d¯, T = a
)
(76)
≥H∞
(
v(tN¯1 )|tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 = tN¯ , d = d¯
)
− log2 |T | − s (77)
=N¯0 − N¯ − s (78)
≥N¯(R0 − 1)− s− 1 (79)
where (79) follows from (56).
We then choose r and δ′ as in Lemma 6. This means for a
∆2 > 0, we choose r ≥ N¯(R0− 1−∆2). Applying Lemma
6 we have the following bounds when (76)-(79) holds:
H
(
E
(
v
(
tN¯1
)
, V
)
|V, tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 = tN¯ , d = d¯, T = a
)
(80)
≥ r − 2−N¯1/2−o(1) (81)
Since the probability that (76)-(79) holds is at least 1−2−s,
we have:
H
(
E
(
v
(
tN¯1
)
, V
)
|V, tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 , d, T
)
(82)
≥ (1− 2−s) (r − 2−N¯1/2−o(1)) (83)
Choose s = εN¯ , where 0 < ε < R0 − 1. Then from (83),
we observe that there exists β > 0, such that
I
(
E
(
v
(
tN¯1
)
, V
)
;V, tN¯1 ⊕ tN¯2 , d, T
)
≤ e−βN¯1/2 (84)
The secret key is then generated from the following
procedure: First node S1 transmit the pure random sequence
V to D1. According to Lemma 6, since the length of binary
representation of V is smaller than ∆1N , where ∆1 can be
arbitrarily small, the rate penalty of sending V is negligible.
Then node S1 transmits the tN¯1 over N channel uses, while
S2 transmits tN¯2 , using the nested lattice coding scheme
described in Section VI. tN¯j , j = 1, 2 is chosen such that
they are uniformly distributed over ΛM ∩ V(Λc)M and tN¯1
and tN¯2 being independent. Finally node D1 decode tN¯1 using
the algorithm given in [9]. The secret key is computed from
E
(
v
(
tN¯1
)
, V
)
.
In this protocol, it is clear that the eavesdropper’s knowl-
edge is a degraded version of V, tN¯1 ⊕tN¯2 , d, T . From (84), we
observe that K is secure. Hence we have proved the theorem.
Remark 4: It is not clear how to invert the extractor
function in [21] efficiently, which requires us to obtain A
from E(A, V ) and V . Because of this reason, the method
is only used for secret key generation, but not for secret
message transmission in this work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we developed coding schemes which provides
strong secrecy by combining nested lattice codes with either
universal hash function or the extractor function. In our
previous work [8], the representation theorem for nested
lattice codes is used to bound the Shannon entropy and prove
weak secrecy rates. Here we showed the same theorem is also
useful in bounding other information theoretic measure, i.e.,
the Re´nyi entropy and the min entropy, which in turn leads
to strong secrecy results. With these coding schemes, we
showed that for an interference channel with a confidential
message, the same secrecy rate, and hence the same secure
degree of freedom derived for weak secrecy is achievable for
the strong secrecy notion as well. The rate region where both
users have confidential messages to transmit can be obtained
by time-sharing between the individual rates. Compared to
previous strong secrecy scheme with nested lattice code, our
scheme achieves faster decrease for the mutual information
between the message and the eavesdropper’s observation with
respect to the number of channel uses.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Consider the set:
A =
{
t :
maxx Pr (X = x|T = t)
maxx Pr (X = x)
> 2s ‖T ‖
}
(85)
Equation (12) is equivalent to Pr [t ∈ A] ≤ 2−s. Suppose it
is otherwise:
Pr [t ∈ A] > 2−s (86)
Then we have
ET
[
max
x
Pr (X = x|T = t)
]
(87)
=
∑
t
Pr (T = t)max
x
Pr (X = x|T = t) (88)
≥
∑
T∈A
Pr (T = t)max
x
Pr (X = x|T = t) (89)
=2s ‖T ‖max
x
Pr (X = x)
∑
T∈A
Pr (T = t) (90)
> ‖T ‖max
x
Pr (X = x) (91)
On the other hand, define x∗t as:
x∗t = argmaxx
Pr (X = x|T = t) (92)
Then we have:
max
x
Pr (X = x) (93)
≥Pr (X = x∗t ) (94)
=
∑
t
Pr (X = x∗t |T = t) Pr (T = t) (95)
≥Pr (X = x∗t |T = t) Pr (T = t) (96)
=max
x
Pr (X = x|T = t) Pr (T = t) (97)
Therefore
ET
[
max
x
Pr (X = x|T = t)
]
(98)
=
∑
t
Pr (T = t)max
x
Pr (X = x|T = t) (99)
≤
∑
t
max
x
Pr (X = x) (100)
= ‖T ‖max
x
Pr (X = x) (101)
To obtain (100), we apply (93)-(97). (98)-(101) contradicts
(87)-(91). Hence we have proved the lemma.
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